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WHY REINVENT THE WHEEL?—PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN 
THE WAKE OF THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 
WITHOUT THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has arguably entered into the recovery period of what 
has become known as the Great Recession.1  This Great Recession, the worst 
economic crisis faced in the United States since the Great Depression, 
witnessed the near collapse of the financial sector of the United States, a rapid 
decline in home values, and large increases in mortgage delinquencies and 
foreclosures.2  While the exact causes of the crisis remain a topic of much 
debate, a rapid increase in the number of subprime mortgages offered by 
various financial institutions, coupled with the crash of the United States. 
housing market in late 2006 to early 2007 caused much of the chaos 
surrounding the Great Recession.3 
Subprime mortgages are mortgages offered to less creditworthy borrowers 
at higher interest rates than traditional loans.4  The number of subprime 
mortgages increased because of an influx of foreign cash into the United 
States, mostly from Asia and the Middle East, and extremely low rates of 
interest promulgated by the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States (Federal 
Reserve).5  These factors drove down interest rates and caused banks to 
aggressively compete to attract borrowers.6  As a result, credit was “cheap and 
 
 1. Mark Lieberman, Leading Economists Declare End to Recession, FOXBUSINESS.COM 
(Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/economy/leading-economists-
declare-end-recession/; Catherine Rampell, ‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology, N.Y. TIMES 
BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009 5:39 P.M.), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-
recession-a-brief-etymology/. 
 2. KATALINA M.BIANCO, CCH, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECT OF 
THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 2 (2008); Press Release, IHS Cambridge Energy Research Assocs., 
Inc., Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great Depression; Risks 
Increase if Right Steps are Not Taken (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.cera.com/aspx/cda/ 
public1/news/pressReleases/pressReleaseDetails.aspx?CID=10119. 
 3. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at 
Morehouse College: Four Questions About the Financial Crisis (Apr. 14, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090414a.htm). 
 4. Dana Dratch, Want a ‘Subprime’ Loan?: What to Watch Out for When Borrowing 
Money, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 12, 2005, at C2. 
 5. BIANCO, supra note 2, at 4; Bernanke, supra note 3. 
 6. Bernanke, supra note 3. 
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easy [for households] to obtain,” driving a housing boom throughout much of 
the country.7  Unfortunately, much of this cheap credit was extended in a 
reckless manner.8  Lending institutions acted carelessly because they believed 
home prices would continue to rise indefinitely and credit would remain cheap 
and easily accessible, allowing borrowers to refinance their homes if 
necessary.9  These beliefs turned out to be false, but many lenders did not 
discover this fact until it was too late, and a crisis was triggered in the United 
States.10 
The fallacy in this reasoning became apparent in early 2007 when housing 
prices began falling, and subprime borrowers could not keep up the payments 
on their mortgages.11  Mortgage delinquencies skyrocketed, which only 
intensified the downturn in home prices.12  Lenders, handicapped with severe 
losses and facing the possibility of insolvency, greatly reduced lending, which 
effectively froze the credit markets.13 
In order to loosen the credit markets and prevent the collapse of these 
financial institutions, the federal government passed the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008.14  This act provided funds to the Secretary of the 
Treasury “to immediately provide authority and facilities . . . to restore 
liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States.”15  
Additionally, the federal government attempted to reenergize the economy and 
encourage job creation through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009.16  As a result of these actions, many believe the recession has ended 
and the long, slow road toward recovery has begun.17  This development 
allowed the federal government to shift the focus of its efforts.  Instead of 
working to stimulate the economy and prop up the financial sector, Congress 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Bernanke, supra note 3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5261). 
 15. Id. § 2(1), 122 Stat. at 3766. 
 16. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 
(2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  This economic stimulus bill was 
in addition to the Economic Stimulus Act passed one year earlier, which provided economic 
stimulus checks to individuals.  Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, § 101, 122 
Stat. 613 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 17. See Lieberman, supra note 1.  The propriety and effectiveness of these economic 
stimulus acts have been much debated; however, those issues are beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
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and the Obama Administration began to look at what caused this crisis and 
consider proposals to prevent similar collapses in the future.18 
President Barack Obama signed one such proposal, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), into law on 
July 21, 2010.19  The goal of the Dodd-Frank Act is “To promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in 
the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer 
by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial services 
practices . . . .”20 
To achieve this goal, the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits deceptive, unfair, and 
abusive practices in transactions involving consumer financial products or 
services.21  Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act creates the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection (BCFP) as “an independent bureau to . . . regulate the 
offering and provision of consumer financial products or services under the 
Federal consumer financial laws.”22  Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the current 
financial regulatory system will be significantly overhauled.23  The regulatory 
authority of the government agencies that currently regulate consumer lending 
will transfer to the BCFP.24  The BCFP is given the power to “implement[] the 
Federal consumer financial laws through rules, orders, guidance, 
interpretations, statements of policy, examinations, and enforcement actions.”25  
Additionally, the BCFP will have power to commence civil actions for 
violations of the Dodd-Frank Act and eighteen other federal statutes.26 
The purpose of this comment is to explore the necessity of the new federal 
bureau to protect consumers from lenders.  Specifically looking at the Truth-
in-Lending Act (TILA), the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
(HOEPA) amendments to TILA, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act (RESPA), this comment examines whether the BCFP is necessary, or if 
subprime borrowers, armed with modified versions of our current federal laws 
and perhaps a new consumer protection law, could adequately protect 
 
 18. See Press Release, Dep’t of the Treas., TG-189, ¶ 96-168, Administration’s Regulatory 
Reform Agenda Moves Forward: Legislation for Strengthening Consumer Protection Delivered to 
Capital Hill (June 30, 2009), http://prod.resource.cch.com/resource/scion/document/default/% 
28%40%40BANK-ISSUE+NOTICE96-168%2909013e2c85801693?cfu=Legal. 
 19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]; 
Kevin G. Hall, Obama Signs Historic Financial Overhaul Bill, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 
22, 2010, at A9. 
 20. Dodd-Frank Act pmbl, 124 Stat. at 1376. 
 21. Id. § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2005. 
 22. Id. § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964. 
 23. See id. §§ 1061–1067, 124 Stat. at 2035–56. 
 24. See id. § 1061(b), 124 Stat. at 2036. 
 25. Dodd-Frank Act § 1012(a)(10), 124 Stat. at 1965. 
 26. Id. §§ 1002(12), (14), 1054(a), 124 Stat. at 1957, 2028. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
460 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:457 
themselves through private litigation.  Part I of this comment will provide a 
brief background of subprime lending and the United States housing bubble, as 
well as how these developments led to the near collapse of the United States 
financial system.  Part II will examine the BCFP as it will exist under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, specifically focusing on the litigation authority delegated to 
the BCFP.  Part III explores the consequences the BCFP will likely have on the 
availability and cost of consumer credit.  Part IV will explain the provisions of 
TILA, including the HOEPA amendments and RESPA, exploring their 
requirements and the remedies they provide for subprime borrowers who are 
misled by their lenders.  Finally, Part V contains an evaluation of the BCFP 
and offers constructive alternatives for achieving consumer protection and 
financial stability without this new governmental bureau. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUBPRIME LENDING 
AND THE HOUSING BUBBLE 
This section provides a brief overview of the historical background that led 
to the financial crisis, including the rise of subprime mortgages and the 
bursting of the United States housing bubble.  A housing bubble is an 
economic bubble that occurs in real estate markets.27  A real estate bubble is 
characterized by rapidly-rising real estate values to unsustainable levels.28  
Subsequently, prices fall, leaving mortgage debt in excess of property values.29 
In the past two decades, the United States has been the recipient of a great 
deal of foreign savings, which flooded into our financial institutions and 
provided large amounts of capital used for making loans.30  Former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan argues this foreign investment was the 
driving factor behind decreasing interest rates and increasing housing prices.31  
However, in the wake of the dot-com bust and economic recession in 2001, the 
Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rates from 6.5% to 1%.32  Richard W. 
Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas, admit the Federal Reserve’s interest policy during the early 2000s was 
“misguided.”33  Mr. Fisher acknowledges the Federal Reserve’s policy 
increased liquidity and speculation in the housing market, thus contributing to 
the housing bubble.34 
 
 27. BIANCO, supra note 2, at 3. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Bernanke, supra note 3. 
 31. BIANCO, supra note 2, at 4. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 5. 
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Flush with cash and facing stiff competition, financial institutions began to 
aggressively lend to customers.35  This competition, combined with low 
interest rates, made consumer credit cheap and easily obtained.36  
Consequently, mortgage lending greatly increased, further fueling the housing 
boom.37  In the decade between 1994 and 2004, home ownership increased 
from 64% to a record-level 69.2%.38  This increased demand drove an 
incredible 124% increase in home values between 1997 and 2006.39  Kenneth 
Rogoff, professor of economics and public policy at Harvard University, 
explained that “At the heart of what happened [during the housing boom] is 
that we lost perspective on what was real and what was really [illusion] fueled 
by . . . low interest rates, [and an] influx of money” into the United States from 
emerging markets.40 
Unfortunately, according to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, 
“[M]uch of this lending was poorly done, involving . . . little or no down 
payment by the borrower or insufficient consideration by the lender of the 
borrower’s ability to make the monthly payments.”41  This poor lending came 
in the form of subprime mortgages.42  As previously mentioned, subprime 
mortgages are loans made to borrowers with poor credit or other flaws, which 
prevent the borrowers from obtaining traditional loans.43  The amount of 
subprime mortgages grew from $35 billion in 1995 to $807 billion in 2005.44  
In 1996, subprime mortgages made up 9% of the loans originated in the United 
States; however, by 2006, subprime mortgages accounted for 20% of the home 
loans made in the United States.45 
As the prevalence of subprime mortgages grew, the standards to qualify for 
even a subprime mortgage fell, allowing more people into the market.46  
Lenders became careless because they made two assumptions: 1) They thought 
home prices would keep rising, allowing borrowers to build equity; and 2) 
 
 35. Bernanke, supra note 3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. BIANCO, supra note 2, at 6. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Press Release, IHS Cambridge Energy Research Assocs., Inc., supra note 2. 
 41. Bernanke, supra note 3. 
 42. See BIANCO, supra note 2, at 6. 
 43. Bernanke, supra note 3; Dale Ledbetter, Understanding the Sub-prime Debacle, in 
PRACTISING LAW INST., CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK, SER. NO. 1633 35, 
39 (2007). 
 44. David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape 15 
(Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper Series, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1333798.  This computes to an increase in subprime lending of greater than 3500%. 
 45. BIANCO, supra note 2, at 6. 
 46. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 25. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
462 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:457 
They believed credit would remain readily accessible, enabling borrowers to 
refinance if the mortgage became too burdensome.47 
Subprime mortgages carry significantly higher interest rates and fees than 
traditional mortgages, with interest rates sometimes reaching 10% to 11%, 
with fees exceeding $10,000.48  Additionally, before the crisis, many subprime 
loans were extended for 100% of the value of the property; 80% of subprime 
loans carry adjustable rates.49  Most subprime mortgages were extended 
without so much as confirming the borrower’s income, and many borrowers 
who obtained subprime mortgages had credit scores of less than 580.50  
Furthermore, many subprime borrowers were qualified for loans using low 
introductory rates, which soon escalated, resulting in monthly payments the 
borrowers were unable to afford.51 
While foreign cash and the decreasing interest rates drove a housing boom, 
these factors also caused returns on “safe” investments such as United States 
Treasury Bonds to fall.52  This forced investors, searching for increased 
returns, toward more risky investments.53  In an effort to assist investors, the 
financial industry created securities known as asset-backed or mortgage-
backed securities, which combined many individual loans in complex ways.54 
Asset-backed securities are securities: 
[P]rimarily serviced by the cash flows of a discrete pool of receivables or other 
financial assets, either fixed or revolving, that by their terms convert into cash 
within a finite time period, plus any rights or other assets designed to assure 
the servicing or timely distributions of proceeds to the security holders.55 
Mortgage-backed securities are asset-backed securities representing “claims to 
the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most commonly on residential 
property.”56  Mortgage-backed securities are created by purchasing mortgage 
 
 47. Bernanke, supra note 3. 
 48. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 15–16.  However, from 2001 to 2007 the average difference 
in interest rates between traditional mortgages and subprime mortgages fell from two and eight-
tenths percentage points to one and three-tenths percentage points.  This decrease reflects a 
decline in the “risk premium” lenders required for taking on subprime borrowers.  BIANCO, supra 
note 2, at 6–7. 
 49. Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclosures: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) 
(statement of Sen. Chris Dodd, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs); 
Schmudde, supra note 44, at 15. 
 50. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 15. 
 51. Id. at 18–19. 
 52. Bernanke, supra note 3. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. (describing new securities made by bundling individual loans). 
 55. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1101 (2009). 
 56. Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
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loans from banks and mortgage companies, pooling those loans, and issuing 
securities.57  This process, known as securitization, may be completed by 
governmental and quasi-governmental entities, as well as by private 
businesses.58  The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), 
the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) issue most mortgage-backed 
securities.59 
Traditionally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provided liquidity to the 
standard mortgage market.60  These government-sponsored entities would 
purchase the loans from the originating lenders and issue securities using the 
mortgages as collateral.61  After selling the initial loan to Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac, the banks had cash that could be used to make a second loan.62  
Investors purchased the securities, relying on guarantees of timely payments 
provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.63  This system worked quite well 
because the loans purchased were prime mortgages which met “well-defined 
lending standards.”64  Because loan default rates were low, investors came to 
see mortgage-backed securities as safe investments.65 
In a quest for increased return on investment, however, “creative 
investment bankers began to develop more complex, sophisticated securities 
backed by mortgages.”66  Financial firms began to include adjustable-rate 
subprime mortgages in pools with prime mortgages, without properly 
disclosing the source of the subprime loans or that very little due diligence was 
completed to determine their quality.67  Mortgage originators believed “Wall 
Street” would accept any product, and they obliged by making and selling 
more subprime mortgages.68  Therefore, despite the belief that these mortgage-
backed securities were safe, they proved to contain significant risks that neither 
the financial institutions that created them nor the investors who purchased 
them foresaw.69 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Ledbetter, supra note 43, at 39. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.; Mortgage Backed Securities, supra note 56. 
 64. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 32. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 33.  For a brief overview of the development of complex mortgage-backed 
securities, see id. at 33 n.92. 
 67. Ledbetter, supra note 43, at 43. 
 68. Id. at 41–43. 
 69. Bernanke, supra note 3. 
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In early 2007, it became apparent that the two assumptions upon which 
bankers handed out loans with reckless abandon were not well founded.70  The 
credit boom began to fall apart when housing prices started dropping and 
subprime borrowers were unable to stay current on their mortgage payments.71  
As a result of this phenomenon, mortgage delinquencies and defaults rose, 
exacerbating the fall in home values.72  Investors were spooked and began 
pulling back from the credit markets while lenders, facing incredible mortgage 
losses, dramatically cut back their lending.73  This, in turn, led to the demise of 
several major financial firms and froze the credit markets.74 
II.  THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION: STRUCTURE AND 
FUNCTION 
In the wake of this crisis United States House Representative for 
Massachusetts, Barney Frank, introduced House Resolution 4173 on December 
2, 2009.75  The resolution passed the House on December 11, 2009.76  On April 
15, 2010, United States Senator for Connecticut, Christopher Dodd, introduced 
his own financial reform bill, Senate Resolution 3217, known as the Restoring 
American Financial Stability Act of 2010.77  Rather than passing Senate 
Resolution 3217, the Senate instead passed an amended version of H.R. 4173 
on May 20, 2010.78  Subsequently, a joint conference committee of 
congressional negotiators reconciled the differences between the version of the 
bill passed by the House in December of 2009 and the amended Senate 
version.79  The conference report was filed with the House on June 29, 2010 
and agreed to on June 30, 2010.80  The Senate agreed to the conference report 
on July 15, 2010.81  President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law as 
Public Law Number 111-203 on July 21, 2010.82 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Bernanke, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
 75. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (as introduced in House, Dec. 2, 2009). 
 76. 155 CONG. REC. H14,747–H14,804 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009). 
 77. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. Res. 3217, 111th Cong. § 1(a) 
(2010) (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 15, 2010). 
 78. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. Res. 3217, 111th Cong. § 1(a) 
(2010) (as passed by Senate, May 20, 2010).  See also 156 CONG. REC. S4027–S4078 (daily ed. 
May 20, 2010). 
 79. H.R. REP. NO. 111-524 (2010). 
 80. Id.; 156 CONG. REC. H5212–H5222 (daily ed. June 30, 2010). 
 81. 156 CONG. REC. S5870–S5933 (daily ed. July 15, 2010). 
 82. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is to promote financial stability, 
reform the mortgage markets, protect consumers and investors, and prevent a 
future financial meltdown.83  The law, which is over 2,000 pages in length,84 is 
considered “the most sweeping overhaul of the financial system since the New 
Deal.”85  The bill expands the grasp of federal banking and securities 
regulation, subjecting a significantly larger cross-section of financial 
companies as well as derivatives markets to regulation by the federal 
government.86  The bill seeks to end the idea of “too big to fail,” by creating a 
council of regulators with power to identify risks in the financial sector and 
constrain or even dismantle troubled businesses without the use of taxpayer 
funds.87  The “Volcker Rule,” another addition to the bill, “restricts the ability 
of banks whose deposits are federally insured from trading for their own 
benefit.”88  In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act creates the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection to oversee financial products and services.89 
The BCFP began with a proposal from the Obama Administration to create 
a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) as a centerpiece of its 
financial industry overhaul.90  In the House of Representatives, Representative 
Frank first introduced the CFPA as House Resolution 3126 on July 8, 2009.91  
Subsequently, House Resolution 3126 was folded in as Title IV of the Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009.92  Senator Dodd’s 
original financial reform bill also contained the CFPA, but the final version of 
Senator Dodd’s bill, which ultimately became the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Annalyn Censky, Obama on New Law: “No More Taxpayer Bailouts”, CNNMONEY. 
COM (July 21, 2010, 12:46 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/21/news/economy/obama_signs_ 
wall_street_reform_bill/index.htm. 
 86. Financial Regulatory Reform, NYTIMES.COM (July 21, 2010), http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/financial_regulatory_reform/index.html. 
 87. Dodd-Frank Act § 111, 124 Stat. at 1392.  See also Financial Regulatory Reform, supra, 
note 86. 
 88. Dodd-Frank Act § 601, 124 Stat. at 1596.  The “Volcker Rule” is named for former 
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker, who introduced the rule in early 2010.  Financial 
Regulatory Reform, supra note 86. 
 89. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964. 
 90. Annemarie Schumacher, Bankers Wonder About Congress’ Regulation Plans, ST. LOUIS 
BUS. J., Nov. 20, 2009, at 24. 
 91. 155 CONG. REC. H7836–H7837 (daily ed. July 8, 2009).  See also H.R. 3126: Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, NYTIMES.COM, http://politics.nytimes.com/congress/ 
bills/111/hr3126 (last visited Feb. 6, 2010). 
 92. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. §§ 
4001–4901 (2009) (as introduced in House Dec. 2, 2009). 
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, replaced the CFPA with the 
BCFP, an independent bureau housed within the Federal Reserve.93 
President Obama, when introducing his version of the CFPA, stated the 
purpose of the agency, proclaiming 
  This agency will have the power to set standards so that companies 
compete by offering innovative products that consumers actually want—and 
actually understand.  Consumers will be provided information that is simple, 
transparent, and accurate.  You’ll be able to compare products and see what’s 
best for you.  The most unfair practices will be banned.  Those ridiculous 
contracts with pages of fine print that no one can figure out—those things will 
be a thing of the past.  And enforcement will be the rule, not the exception.94 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner also spoke out in favor of the CFPA, 
stating 
  This agency will have only one mission—to protect consumers—and have 
the authority and accountability to make sure that consumer-protection 
regulations are written fairly and enforced vigorously.  Consumer protection 
will have an independent seat at the table in our financial regulatory system.  
By consolidating accountability in one place, we will reduce gaps in federal 
supervision and enforcement, drive greater clarity in the information 
consumers receive around products they are sold, set higher standards for those 
who sell those products and promote consistent regulation across the system.95 
In the Obama Administration’s version of the CFPA, the CFPA would 
have had the power to prohibit certain consumer financial products or services 
or certain features of those products, impose additional disclosure requirements 
on consumer financial products or services providers, and require providers to 
offer “plain vanilla” products the CFPA designed.96  Additionally, the Obama 
Administration’s bill would have required lenders to make “reasonable 
 
 93. Compare Binyamin Appelbaum & Brady Dennis, Dodd Bill Would Redo Entire 
Regulatory System, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2009, at A18, with Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203 § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964. 
 94. Press Release, Dep’t of the Treas., supra note 18. 
 95. Id. 
 96. David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit 4 (Geo. Mason U. Law & Econ., Research Paper Ser. 
No. 09-50, Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1483906.  Thomas W. Hough 
believes this position stems from a misunderstanding of the White House Proposal.  Interview 
with Thomas W. Hough, Chief Exec. Officer, Carrollton Bank, in St. Louis, Mo. (Jan. 25, 2010) 
(on file with author).  He does not believe banks would have been required to offer the “plain 
vanilla” products.  Id.  Mr. Hough is also Chairman of the Illinois Bankers’ Association.  IBA 
Board of Directors, ILL. BANKERS ASS’N., http://www.ilbanker.com/leadership_board_ 
directors.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).  Carrollton Bank is a community bank established in 
1877 in Carrollton, Illinois that currently has $790 million in assets.  CARROLLTON BANK, THE 
CARROLLTON BANK STORY 3–6 (2010), available at http://www.carrolltonbanking.com/pdfs/cb 
Story.pdf. 
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disclosures” and would have expressly allowed state and local governments to 
impose additional restrictions on consumer financial products, beyond those 
imposed by the federal government.97  This would have essentially made 
federal regulation the regulatory floor and “end[ed] federal preemption of state 
consumer protection for nationally chartered financial institutions.”98 
The Treasury Department and the House Democrats, including 
Representative Frank recognized some of these provisions were unlikely to be 
approved by Congress.99  As a result, House Resolution 4173 modified several 
of President Obama’s original provisions.100  These modifications, many of 
which were carried through to the Dodd-Frank Act, resulted in President 
Obama getting approximately 90% of the reforms he proposed.101  Despite 
backing off some of President Obama’s more controversial proposals, the 
Dodd-Frank Act is expected to have a significant impact on lending in this 
country.102 
One difference between the Obama Administration’s proposal and the final 
financial reform bill regarded the CFPA.  Rather than creating the CFPA as an 
independent agency, the Dodd-Frank Act creates the BCFP as an independent 
bureau housed within the Federal Reserve.103  The purpose of the BCFP is to 
“regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services 
under the Federal consumer financial laws.”104  A Director, appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, will head the BCFP.105  
The Director will serve for five years and may only be removed prior to the 
end of his term for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”106  
During his term, the Director is barred from holding any position within “any 
Federal reserve bank, Federal home loan bank, covered person, or service 
provider.”107  The BCFP will have the responsibility to carry out the consumer 
financial protection functions currently held by: 1) the Board of Governors [of 
the Federal Reserve]; 2) the Comptroller of Currency; 3) the Director of the 
Office of Thrift Supervision; 4) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 5) 
 
 97. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 35. 
 98. Id. at 3. 
 99. David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, A Response to Professor Levitin on the Effect of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit 4 (Geo. Mason Univ. 
Law & Econ., Research Paper Ser. 09-56, Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1499261. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Stephanie Condon, Obama: Financial Reform Deal Has 90 Percent of What I Proposed, 
CBS NEWS (June 25, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20008823-503544.html. 
 102. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the economic impact of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 103. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. § 1011(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1964. 
 106. Id. § 1011(c)(1), (3), 124 Stat. at 1964. 
 107. Id. § 1011(d), 124 Stat. at 1964. 
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the Federal Trade Commission’s functions under the enumerated consumer 
protection laws; 6) the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA); and 7) 
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) relating to the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, the Secure and Fair Enforcement for 
Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure 
Act.108  The duties transferred to the BCFP include “all authority to prescribe 
rules or issue orders or guidelines pursuant to any Federal consumer financial 
law, including performing appropriate functions to promulgate and review 
such rules, orders, and guidelines.”109  Additionally, the BCFP may 
“implement[] the Federal consumer financial laws through rules, orders, 
guidance, interpretations, statements of policy, examinations, and enforcement 
actions.”110 
The Dodd-Frank Act also makes it unlawful for any covered person “to 
offer or provide to a consumer any financial product or service not in 
conformity with Federal consumer financial law, or otherwise commit any act 
or omission in violation of a Federal consumer financial law; or to engage in 
any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice.”111  Consumer financial 
products or services include “any financial product or service that is 
described . . . under [the Act]” and “(A) . . . is offered or provided for use by 
consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; or (B) . . . is 
delivered, offered, or provided in connection with a consumer financial 
product or service.”112 
The BCFP is further provided with authority to take action “to prevent a 
covered person or service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair, 
 
 108. Dodd-Frank Act § 1061(b), 124 Stat. at 2036. 
 109. Id. § 1061(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2036. 
 110. Id. § 1012(a)(10), 124 Stat. at 1965. 
 111. Id. § 1036(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2010. 
 112. Id. §§ 1002(5), (15)(A), 124 Stat. at 1957–60.  “Financial product or service” is defined 
in the Dodd-Frank Act to mean: 1) extending credit and servicing loans; 2) “extending or 
brokering leases of personal or real property”; 3) providing real estate settlement services; 4) 
“engaging in deposit-taking activities, transmitting or exchanging funds”; 5) “selling, providing, 
or issuing stored value or payment instruments”; 6) “providing check cashing, check collection, 
or check guaranty services”; 7) “providing payments or other financial data processing products 
or services to a consumer by any technological means”; 8) “providing financial advisory services 
. . . to consumers on individual financial matters”; 9) “collecting, analyzing, maintaining, or 
providing consumer report information or other account information”; 10) “collecting debt related 
to any consumer financial product or service”; and 11) “such other financial product or service as 
may be defined by the [BCFP], by regulation, for purposes of [Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act], if 
the Bureau finds that such financial product or service . . . is entered into or conducted as a 
subterfuge or with a purpose to evade any Federal consumer financial law; or permissible for a 
bank or for a financial holding company to offer or to provide under any provision of a Federal 
law or regulation applicable to a bank or a financial holding company, and has, or likely will 
have, a material impact on consumers.”  Id. § 1002(15), 124 Stat. at 1958–60. 
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deceptive, or abusive act or practice under Federal law in connection with any 
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the 
offering of a consumer financial product or service.”113  The BCFP, however, 
is not given authority to declare acts or practices unfair “unless the Bureau has 
a reasonable basis to conclude that . . . the act or practice causes or is likely to 
cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers; and . . . such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to competition.”114 
The BCFP has various tools to prevent unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts, 
including assessing civil monetary penalties, instituting adjudicatory hearings, 
or even commencing civil lawsuits.115  The Bureau may “conduct hearings and 
adjudication proceedings . . . in order to ensure or enforce compliance with the 
provisions of [Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act] . . .; and any other federal law 
that the [BCFP] is authorized to enforce, including an enumerated consumer 
law” or regulations promulgated under those acts.116 
Additionally, the BCFP may commence a civil action “to impose a civil 
penalty or to seek all appropriate legal and equitable relief including a 
permanent or temporary injunction as permitted by law” for violations of a 
federal consumer financial law.117  Federal consumer financial law includes 
“the provisions of [Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act], the enumerated consumer 
laws, the laws for which authorities are transferred [to the BCFP], and any rule 
or order prescribed by the [BCFP].”118  The enumerated consumer laws include 
the following: the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982; the 
Consumer Leasing Act of 1976; the Electronic Fund Transfer Act; the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act; the Fair Credit Billing Act; the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act; the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998; the Fair Debt Collection 
 
 113. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2005.  A “covered person” within the meaning of 
the Dodd-Frank Act means “any person that engages in offering or providing a consumer 
financial product or service; and any affiliate of [that] person . . . if such affiliate acts as a service 
provider to such person.”  Id. § 1002(6), 124 Stat. at 1956.  A “person” means an “individual, 
partnership, company, corporation, association (incorporated or unincorporated), trust, estate, 
cooperative organization, or other entity.”  Id. § 1002(19), 124 Stat. at 1961.  A “service 
provider” within the Dodd-Frank Act means “any person that provides a material service to a 
covered person in connection with the offering or provision by such covered person of a 
consumer financial product or service . . . that participates in designing, operating, or maintaining 
the consumer financial product or service; or processes transactions relating to the consumer 
financial product or service . . . .”  Id. § 1002(26), 124 Stat. 1562–63. 
 114. Id. § 1031(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2006. 
 115. See generally id. §§ 1051–1058, 124 Stat. at 2018–35 (outlining the authority of the 
Commission to make and enforce rules using fines, an administrative hearing process, and civil 
litigation). 
 116. Id. § 1053(a), 124 Stat. at 2025. 
 117. Id. § 1054(a), 124 Stat. at 2028. 
 118. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(14), 124 Stat. at 1957. 
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Practices Act; Subsections (b) through (f) of section 43 of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act; Sections 502 through 509 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act; the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975; the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act of 1994; the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; the 
S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008; the Truth in Lending Act; the Truth 
in Savings Act; Section 626 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009; and the 
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.119 
The court in a proceeding brought under federal consumer financial law is 
given jurisdiction to grant any appropriate legal or equitable remedies.120  Such 
relief may include “rescission or reformation of contracts; refund of moneys or 
return of real property; restitution; disgorgement or compensation for unjust 
enrichment; payment of damages or other monetary relief; public notification 
regarding the violation, including costs of notification; limits on the activities 
or functions of the person; and civil money penalties.”121  The courts, however, 
are not authorized to impose exemplary or punitive damages.122 
The civil monetary penalties the BCFP or the courts may assess are 
divided into three tiers.123  Tier one imposes a penalty not to exceed $5,000, for 
each day a “violation of a law, rule, or final order or condition imposed in 
writing by the Bureau.”124  The second tier imposes a penalty not to exceed 
$25,000, for reckless violations of any federal consumer financial law.125  Tier 
three imposes a civil penalty up to $1,000,000 per day, for knowingly violating 
a federal consumer financial law.126 
III.  EFFECT OF THE BCFP ON CONSUMERS 
The proposal to create the CFPA, and by extension the creation of the 
BCFP, has been praised by some while criticized by others.  Critics argue this 
new bureau will do nothing but limit the credit available to consumers and 
raise the costs of obtaining that credit.127  Credit is vitally important to the 
economy of the United States.  Consumers need credit to provide liquidity 
when cash is unavailable and to spread the cost of large purchases such as 
homes, vehicles, and educations over time.128  Credit drives a substantial 
 
 119. Id. § 1002(12), 124 Stat. at 1957. 
 120. Id. § 1055(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1957. 
 121. Id. § 1055(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 2030. 
 122. Id. § 1055(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 2030. 
 123. Dodd-Frank Act § 1055(c), 124 Stat. at 2030. 
 124. Id. § 1055(c)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 2030. 
 125. Id. § 1055(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 2030. 
 126. Id. § 1055(c)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 2030. 
 127. See, e.g., Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 3. 
 128. Id. at 6–7.  As noted previously, the BCFP was developed as an alternative to the CFPA.  
The BCFP, however, will function in a manner substantially similar to how the CFPA would have 
operated.  As a result, the effect of the BCFP on consumer lending will be the same as the 
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portion of consumer spending, which is the lifeblood of the economy.129  For 
the most part, consumers are responsible in their use of credit, and its 
availability allows consumers to increase their standard of living.130  There are 
some consumers, though, who do not responsibly use credit, taking on large 
amounts of debt they are unable to repay.131  It is for this reason that extending 
credit is a risky business for lenders who are uncertain whether the consumers 
will be able to repay the principal of the loan.132 
Due to the importance of credit to the economy and the risks associated 
with extending credit, it is important to ensure the availability of credit while 
providing regulation to ensure credit is dispensed in a responsible manner.  
Some economists argue that “stronger consumer protection regulation could 
make these consumers better off by regulating the design of these products, 
mandating various disclosures, restricting consumer choice, and ‘nudging’ 
consumer toward certain standardized financial products.”133  On the other 
hand, ill-considered consumer protections “could reverse the increase in the 
availability and democratization of credit that consumers have benefited from 
over the last thirty years.”134 
Some critics, including Professors David Evans and Joshua Wright, argue 
that the reforms offered by the Dodd-Frank Act fall into the latter category of 
ill-considered consumer protections that would limit the availability of 
consumer credit.135  They contend that the BCFP is likely to create a 
bureaucratic and legal disaster.136  Other critics argue the reforms offered by 
the BCFP are duplicative of existing consumer protections and will dampen the 
availability of credit to consumers.137  The BCFP, according to Evans and 
Wright, will also significantly increase the cost of providing credit to 
consumers.138  Lenders will encounter significant uncertainty about the 
requirements of the BCFP and regulations promulgated by the BCFP.139  
Sorting out these requirements will require countless hours of research and 
significant expenditures for legal advice.  Additionally, lenders may face an 
 
projected effect of the CFPA.  Compare Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1001–1100H, 124 Stat. at 1367–
2113, with Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. §§ 
10051–10302 (2009) (as passed by the House of Representatives on Dec.11, 2009). 
 129. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 48. 
 130. Id. at 8–9. 
 131. Id. at 8. 
 132. Id. at 9. 
 133. Id. at 29. 
 134. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 43. 
 135. See, e.g., id. at 43 (listing the ways in which the CFPA will limit consumer access to 
credit). 
 136. Id. at 37–38. 
 137. Interview with Thomas W. Hough, supra note 96. 
 138. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 39–40. 
 139. Id. at 37–38. 
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onslaught of litigation or the assessment of penalties.140  Courts also will be 
faced with the difficult task of defining unfair, deceptive, and abusive 
practices.141  Loans will require additional paperwork, and new products will 
be subjected to an expensive and comprehensive review process.142  The 
lenders will seek compensation for these additional requirements and will 
likely pass the costs of compliance onto consumers, raising the cost of 
obtaining credit.143 
In addition to additional costs associated with obtaining credit, consumers 
are likely to have more difficulty obtaining credit under the BCFP.  Customers 
whose credit scores and circumstances place them on the borderline of a 
particular bank’s lending requirements are likely to find a reduction in 
available loans under the BCFP.144  The reason is that bankers will deem these 
borderline loans too risky and decline to extend them for fear of facing fines or 
litigation.145  Furthermore, the BCFP, using its authority to ban products it 
deems unfair or deceptive, may prevent certain innovative products from being 
offered.146  Determining that a product is unfair or deceptive in the abstract 
fails to account for consumers making logical choices to accept the risk of a 
product to achieve particular end goals.147  Thus, the BCFP will limit consumer 
autonomy and choice by limiting the availability of innovative consumer 
financial products.148 
IV.  CURRENT CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS AVAILABLE TO SUBPRIME 
BORROWERS 
The BCFP’s benefits do not outweigh its risks, and given the likely effect 
that it will have on lending, it is unnecessary.  The BCFP is unnecessary 
because individuals wronged by predatory lenders already have a mechanism 
for redressing their injuries through civil actions that the Dodd-Frank Act tasks 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 37. 
 142. Id. at 38. 
 143. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 39–40.  For an estimate of the cost increase caused by 
passage of the BCFP, see id. at 43–47. 
 144. Interview with Thomas W. Hough, supra note 96. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 36. 
 147. Id. at 41.  Judge Richard Posner argues this is what happened during the subprime 
mortgage crisis.  Richard A. Posner, Op-Ed., Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting 
Adults, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2009, at A15.  According to Judge Posner, “It cannot just be 
assumed that most people who during the housing boom bought homes with adjustable-rate 
mortgages, or mortgages with prepayment penalties, or mortgages that required a low or even no 
down payment, were fools or victims of fraud.”  Id.  At the time these loans were made, the 
government denied that the rapid increase in home prices was a bubble and interest rates were 
low, and for that reason, many Americans chose—logically—to borrow.  Id. 
 148. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 43. 
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the BCFP with enforcing.149  This Comment does not take the position that 
consumers do not need protection or that the current state of the law provides 
sufficient protection.  Instead, this Comment considers whether the new 
government bureau will actually improve protection of consumers injured by 
predatory or less than forthcoming lenders. 
As mentioned above, the Dodd-Frank Act enumerates several federal laws 
and provides the BCFP with authority to pursue civil lawsuits for violations of 
those laws.150  Several of these enumerated laws, however, already allow 
individuals to pursue civil suits for violations of those statutes.151  Therefore, 
the BCFP simply creates a duplicative right of redress. 
Currently, a subprime borrower who feels he has been misled by a lender 
or has been the victim of predatory lending can seek redress through the court 
system.  In fact, the subprime mortgage meltdown has spawned a wave of 
litigation under laws already in force.152  These plaintiffs have numerous 
possible causes of action, including those based upon violations of the federal 
statutes enumerated in the Dodd-Frank Act—specifically, TILA and 
RESPA.153  In addition, consumers have the ability to combine these claims 
 
 149. Another reason the BCFP is unnecessary is that the current regulatory structure of the 
United States, specifically the Federal Trade Commission, with a few modifications is fully 
capable of regulating financial products and services to prevent a future collapse of the financial 
market as was experienced during 2007–2008.  However, Jon Leibowitz, Chairman of the Federal 
Trade Commission, when testifying before Congress explained, “Many of the rulemaking, 
enforcement, education, and research functions of the [BCFP] are functions that the FTC 
currently performs with respect to entities under its jurisdiction.”  Proposed Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency: Implications for Consumers and the Federal Trade Commission Before the H. 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Protection, 111th 
Cong. 15 (2009) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n), available at 
www.ftc.gov/os/2009/07/090708Acfpatestimony.pdf.  The FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce except for banks, savings and loan institutions, and 
certain credit unions, which are exempted from regulation by the FTC.  Id. at 2.  If Congress’s 
goal in creating the BCFP was to provide one agency with the responsibility for regulating 
consumer financial products, Congress could have simply removed the banking exemptions from 
the FTC act allowing the FTC to regulate all consumer financial products, rather than creating an 
entirely new bureau. 
 150. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 §§ 1002(12), 1002(14), 1054(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 
1957, 2028 (2010). 
 151. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a), 2605(f), 2607(d)(5) (2006). 
 152. See Brian E. Robison, Litigation in the Wake of the Subprime Lending Collapse: What 
Has Happened and Where We Are, 14 No. 4 ANDREWS DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 22 (Jan. 7, 
2008) (detailing the numerous types of actions that have resulted from the subprime crisis); 
Schmudde, supra note 44, at 63 (providing a similar list of lawsuits brought due to the subprime 
lending crisis). 
 153. Allison Torres Burtka, Predatory-Lending Litigation Looms, TRIAL, May 2008, at 16, 
16; Arielle L. Katzman, Note, A Round Peg for a Square Hole: The Mismatch Between Subprime 
Borrowers and Federal Mortgage Remedies, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 498 (2009). 
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with others based on state consumer protection acts and state common law 
fraud, which are beyond the purview of the BCFP.154 
Since the beginning of 2007, 866 subprime mortgage-related cases have 
been filed in federal court—290 in 2007 and 576 in 2008.155  Twenty-four 
percent of the suits filed in 2008 were borrower class actions.156  In 2007, 
borrower class actions accounted for 43% of subprime-related litigation.157  
These suits have been filed against mortgage brokers, lenders, appraisers, title 
companies, and numerous other players in the mortgage origination and 
securitization market.158  Twenty-eight percent of these class actions alleged 
inadequate disclosures, and 12% alleged discriminatory lending practices in 
2007 and 2008.159  However, the most common claims found in these borrower 
class actions involve improper charges or payments made during the loan 
origination process.160 
It has been argued that the current federal consumer protection statutes 
were not developed for the subprime market and that the redress available 
under these statutes does not provide adequate protection for consumers 
because subprime mortgages are complex transactions.161  Even if all the 
required disclosures regarding the terms and costs of the loans are presented to 
the borrowers, the borrowers lack the wherewithal and skill necessary to 
properly evaluate the loan and make an informed decision about whether they 
can or cannot afford the loan.162  This portion of the Comment will briefly 
explain the requirements of TILA, including the HOEPA amendments and 
RESPA, as well as the provisions in these acts that allow consumers to bring 
private lawsuits for their violations.  It will then consider the shortfalls of these 
statutes in the subprime-lending context. 
A. The Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) 
TILA, passed in 1968, is a consumer credit law intended to protect 
consumers by requiring lenders to make certain disclosures in credit 
transactions.163  TILA mandates that mortgage lenders disclose certain 
information, including the amount financed, the finance charge represented as 
 
 154. Katzman, supra note 153, at 539–40. 
 155. JEFF NIELSON ET AL., NAVIGANT CONSULTING, SUBPRIME MORTGAGE AND RELATED 
LITIGATION 2008: SEEKING RELIEF 4 (2009). 
 156. Id. 
 157. JEFF NIELSON ET AL., NAVIGANT CONSULTING, SUBPRIME MORTGAGE AND RELATED 
LITIGATION 2007:  LOOKING BACK AT WHAT’S AHEAD 2 (2007). 
 158. NIELSON ET AL., supra note 155, at 5. 
 159. Id. at 10. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Katzman, supra note 153, at 511. 
 162. Id. at 509–10. 
 163. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006). 
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an annual percentage rate (APR), and the number and amount of payments 
required to repay the loan before the credit is actually extended.164  The 
purpose of TILA is to ensure that borrowers have all the necessary information 
to calculate the true cost of the loan and to enable borrowers to compare loans 
across lenders.165  TILA also imposes limits on the interest rate that can be 
charged on mortgages.166 
If a creditor fails to satisfy the requirements of TILA or Regulation Z (the 
Federal Reserve’s guideline for complying with TILA), the borrower may 
bring a civil action, which may take the form of a class action lawsuit.167  
Borrowers who bring successful TILA claims are entitled to receive actual 
damages, statutory damages of up to $4,000, reasonable costs of bringing the 
action, and reasonable attorney’s fees.168  In order to recover actual damages, 
courts require the borrowers to establish that the TILA violation was the 
proximate cause of the actual damages.169  This requires the plaintiff to 
establish that: “(1) he read the TILA disclosure statement; (2) he understood 
the charges being disclosed; (3) had the disclosure statement been accurate, he 
would have sought a lower price; and (4) he would have obtained a lower 
price.”170 
Additionally, in certain circumstances, borrowers are able to rescind the 
loan for TILA violations.171  Within three business days of the consummation 
of the loan or the delivery of proper TILA disclosures, whichever is later, the 
borrower can rescind a loan for any reason.172  If the borrower can prove “[he 
or she] received inaccurate material disclosures, [was] not provided material 
disclosures, or [was] not notified of the right to rescind,”173 the borrower can 
rescind the loan for a period of three years.174  Unfortunately, the right of 
rescission does not currently apply to residential mortgage transactions.175 
On its face, TILA appears to have substantial power to protect consumers 
and ensure they know what they are getting themselves into when entering a 
 
 164. Id. § 1638(a). 
 165. See id. § 1601(a). 
 166. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(3) (2010).  These limits were such that they failed to prevent the 
rates charged on subprime mortgages.  Schmudde, supra note 44, at 49. 
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a); Richard J. Link, Annotation, Civil Remedies for Violations of 
Credit Transactions Provisions of Truth In Lending Act (TILA) (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601 et seq.), as 
Amended by Truth In Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1982, 113 A.L.R. FED. 173, 185–
86 (1993). 
 168. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). 
 169. Peters v. Jim Lupient Oldsmobile Co., 220 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 170. Id. 
 171. 15 U.S.C. § 1635. 
 172. Id. § 1635(a); Katzman, supra note 153, at 529. 
 173. Katzman, supra note 153, at 529. 
 174. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), (f). 
 175. Id. § 1635(e)(1). 
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loan.  TILA, though, has several shortcomings.  TILA disclosures provided to 
borrowers, especially in the context of subprime or adjustable rate mortgages, 
are so complex they cannot be understood without great explanation.176  
Additionally, TILA only applies to creditors, but oftentimes, especially with 
subprime borrowers, mortgage brokers who do not meet the definition of 
creditors nevertheless handle the loan origination and communicate directly 
with the client.177  The statutory damages provided by TILA, meant to provide 
incentives for private enforcement, actually provide only “meager damages,” 
allowed only if a borrower can satisfy statutory requirements designed for 
prime borrowers.178  Proving actual damages under TILA is also problematic 
for subprime borrowers.  The second prong, which requires the borrower to 
prove that he understood the charges being discussed in the disclosures, 
undermines the argument that the layperson borrower was unable to 
understand the disclosures.179  The third and fourth prongs fail to account for 
the fact that subprime borrowers, because of their low credit scores, have fewer 
options available for financing.180 
The fact-sensitive inquiry required to recover actual damages also provides 
a substantial barrier for proceeding with class action suits.181  The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure require a prospective class to establish, among other 
things, that there are matters of law and fact common to the class before the 
court can certify a class.182  By requiring plaintiffs to establish the facts 
surrounding the disclosures, the understanding of the disclosures, and reliance 
on the disclosures, it will be extremely difficult for a court to find a 
commonality of facts sufficient to certify a class.183  Additionally, as 
mentioned above, the right of rescission provided by TILA does not apply to 
residential mortgage transactions, effectively barring subprime borrowers from 
using the most beneficial provision of TILA to obtain relief.184  As a result of 
these shortcomings, Congress determined that additional legislation was 
necessary and passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act.185 
 
 176. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 49–50. 
 177. Katzman, supra note 153, at 524–25. 
 178. Id. at 527.  The statutory damages are bonus damages for the plaintiff meant to 
encourage private enforcement as well as to punish and deter defendants from taking the 
prohibited action in the future.  Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow Fin. Co., 630 F.2d 641, 647 (8th 
Cir. 1980). 
 179. Katzman, supra note 153, at 528. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 528–29. 
 182. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 183. Katzman, supra note 153, at 528–29. 
 184. Id. at 530. 
 185.  Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement (Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection) Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1601–1649). 
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B. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) 
The HOEPA amended TILA in 1994 to cover first-lien loans and require 
additional safeguards on high-cost loans.186  HOEPA mandates additional 
disclosure requirements, including full disclosure of interest rates and written 
notice of fees and costs three days prior to closing.187  HOEPA bans specific 
types of terms and practices like prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and 
calling loans prior to their due date.188  Furthermore, HOEPA requires lenders 
to take into consideration the borrower’s ability to repay the loan before 
extending credit and provides regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve.189  
HOEPA also provides causes of actions for consumers to pursue against 
lenders.190 
The HOEPA requirements, while containing many useful parts and much 
needed regulatory authority, have failed to provide sufficient protection for 
subprime borrowers because the requirements do not apply to residential 
mortgage transactions.191  Additionally, despite its ability to regulate under 
HOEPA, the Federal Reserve did not pass any regulations until 2008, after the 
subprime mortgage crisis began.192 
C. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) 
RESPA was enacted in 1974, six years after TILA, to help consumers shop 
for settlement services and to eliminate kickbacks and referral fees that 
increased the cost of settlement services.193  RESPA requires certain disclosure 
requirements for the lender in residential transactions.  “These disclosures 
include: A special information booklet; a good faith estimate of charges; actual 
settlement costs; escrow payments scheduled for the first year of the 
mortgage.”194  Lenders must disclose any ownership interest they have in 
businesses that they recommend to consumers as well.195  Additionally, 
RESPA requires the lender to notify the buyer whether the lender plans to 
 
 186. Katzman, supra note 153, at 508; Schmudde, supra note 44, at 50.  It is important to note 
that HOEPA does not apply to home purchase loans, but rather loans secured by the borrower’s 
primary residence.  15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2006). 
 187. Id. § 1639(a)–(b). 
 188. Id. § 1639(c), (e); Schmudde, supra note 44, at 50. 
 189. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h), (l).  See also Katzman, supra note 153, at 508; Schmudde, supra 
note 44, at 50. 
 190. 15 U.S.C. § 1640.  See also Katzman, supra note 153, at 523. 
 191. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1).  See also Katzman, supra note 153, at 523–24. 
 192. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 50. 
 193. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2006)). 
 194. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 50.  See also 12 U.S.C. §§ 2603–2606. 
 195. 12 U.S.C. § 2607; 25 C.F.R. § 3500.15 (2010). 
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service the loan in house or transfer it to another lender, and to notify the 
borrower if the loan is sold or assigned.196 
RESPA enables borrowers to bring civil actions for monetary damages 
based on kickbacks and unearned fees, servicing violations, and seller-required 
title insurance.197  If a buyer is able to show that referring parties provided 
kickbacks or split settlement fees with one another, the borrower can hold the 
parties jointly and severally liable for three times the amount of any charge 
paid for settlement services, along with court costs and attorney’s fees.198 
Some have argued that RESPA fails to provide relief for many subprime 
borrowers because RESPA was meant to regulate the process of closing a loan, 
not the substantive terms of the loan.199  Others have argued that RESPA cost 
estimates are inaccurate and difficult for inexperienced borrowers to 
understand.200  Also, despite the treble damage provision, it has been argued 
that successful suits under RESPA will result in only small recoveries that do 
not justify the cost of bringing the action.201  Furthermore, RESPA does not 
allow for rescission, which limits its effectiveness in helping consumers.202 
V.  EVALUATION OF THE BCFP AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL 
ACTION 
Given the weaknesses of the current laws and the vast expanse of the crisis 
caused by subprime mortgages, it is understandable that members of Congress 
and the Obama Administration, as part of their financial reform package, 
created a new “agency” to promulgate rules and regulations, pursue civil 
lawsuits, and assess civil monetary penalties.  People are angry and feel that 
“Main Street,” acting through its representatives in Washington, D.C., should 
push back and punish those on “Wall Street” who caused the collapse.203  
While this sentiment is shared by many, and understandably so, the BCFP is 
not the solution to the subprime problem. 
TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA are federal statutes which currently provide 
redress for injured borrowers.  These acts also are included in the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s enumerated consumer laws under which the BCFP can institute civil 
 
 196. 12 U.S.C. § 2605. 
 197. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(f), 2607(d)(1). 
 198. Id. § 2607(d)(2), (5).  See Katzman, supra note 153, at 513 n.100 (describing a conflict 
among courts regarding the application of the treble damage provisions). 
 199. Katzman, supra note 153, at 512. 
 200. Schmudde, supra note 44, at 50. 
 201. Katzman, supra note 153, at 513. 
 202. Id. at 512. 
 203. See Ron Resnick, Another View: Why No Restrictions on Leverage?, DEALBOOK (July 
19, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/another-view-why-no-
restrictions-on-leverage/. 
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lawsuits.204  However, as discussed above, each of these acts has inherent 
weaknesses, which prevent subprime borrowers from obtaining complete 
relief.  A bureau of the federal government bringing the lawsuit, rather than an 
individual plaintiff or group of plaintiffs, will not rectify these weaknesses.  
Just as it is difficult for a consumer bringing a TILA action to establish that he 
understood the disclosures, it will be difficult for the BCFP to establish that the 
borrower read and understood the disclosures.  Throughout the past four 
decades since TILA was enacted, Congress, in an effort to improve loan 
disclosure to consumers, has passed several additional bills increasing the 
number of disclosures provided to buyers.205  This layering of legislation on 
top of legislation has resulted in borrowers being bombarded with documents 
at closing which make the task of understanding the terms of the loan arduous 
and time-consuming—effectively negating the consumer’s ability to truly 
understand the loan.206  This new bureau, with power to prescribe additional 
disclosures, will not solve this problem; in fact it will compound the problem.  
Additionally, allowing a governmental agency to bring a lawsuit will not 
change the fact that TILA’s rescission provisions do not apply to residential 
mortgage transactions.  Nor will it allow the provisions of HOEPA to apply to 
residential mortgage transactions. 
Therefore, rather than creating the BCFP, Congress and the Obama 
Administration should have thoroughly reviewed the existing federal consumer 
protection laws and focused on improving the remedies already available to 
subprime consumers under those acts.  Borrowers would be better served by 
amending TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA to require simpler disclosures and 
better communication of the most essential terms of the loan, including 
principal amount, interest rate, repayment terms, and fees.  Perhaps disclosures 
could be accompanied by a letter stating, in simple terms, the following: “You 
are borrowing _____ dollars, at an interest rate of _____%.  The loan will be 
repaid by payment of _____ dollars each month for _____ consecutive months.  
Over the lifetime of the loan you will be paying _____ dollars, total.”207  If the 
loan has an adjustable rate, additional language should be added, denoting that 
the “APR is subject to increase to a maximum rate of _____%”; explaining 
when the APR can be increased; and providing a series of calculations 
 
 204. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1002(12), 1053(a), 1054(a), 124 Stat. 1957, 
2025, 2028 (2010). 
 205. Interview with Thomas W. Hough, supra note 96. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Much of this information is currently required to be disclosed under 12 C.F.R. §§ 
226.5(a), 226.6 (2009).  Section 226.5 requires creditors to make TILA disclosures “clearly and 
conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer may keep.”  Id. § 226.5.  However, it would 
be beneficial to mandate that this disclosure be in the form of a letter using the simple language 
above because different lenders may understand “clearly and conspicuously” differently.  
Mandating this language would help consumers compare loan options quickly and easily. 
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denoting the amount of monthly payments and total amount paid based upon 
the maximum interest rate.208 
Additionally, Congress should consider requiring the lender to walk 
through the terms of the loan with the consumer, advising them to seek outside 
counsel if they do not understand the provisions of their prospective loan.  
Another recommendation proposed by scholars is to require some form of 
credit counseling for borrowers before they can obtain a mortgage loan, similar 
to that required before filing for bankruptcy.209  These changes would provide 
a great deal more protection than simply allowing a new government agency to 
bring the same flawed causes of action consumers can already bring 
themselves. 
However, even if Congress determined that amending TILA, HOEPA, and 
RESPA did not go far enough, there are still steps that Congress could have 
taken short of creating a new bureau to aid in protecting consumers.  Congress 
could have passed new legislation to provide these protections.  In the Dodd-
Frank Act, the BCFP is provided with the authority to take action “to prevent a 
covered person or service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive act or practice under Federal law in connection with any 
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the 
offering of a consumer financial product or service.”210  Banning unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive practices is a reasonable step toward preventing the 
abuses that gave rise to the financial crisis.  However, instead of using the 
BCFP as the mechanism for preventing such practices, Congress should have 
simply banned those acts and practices and provided a private right of action 
for individual victims.  The private right of action could have provided for 
actual damages, substantial statutory damages, treble damages, and even 
rescission or reformation of the mortgage agreement.  Instead of providing that 
the bureau has the power to assess civil monetary penalties, the legislation 
could have provided for punitive or exemplary damages for egregious 
violations.  Allowing a private right of action with the possibility of punitive 
damages would have adequately served the purposes the BCFP is meant to 
serve—protection of consumers and deterrence of predatory behavior—
without most of the negatives associated with the BCFP. 
Another complication of the BCFP is the cost of administering the bureau.  
As detailed above, the new bureau will likely increase the costs of making 
 
 208. Mr. Hough mentioned that these requirements would help improve standard prime 
transactions.  However, with the complexity that often accompanies subprime mortgages, simple 
disclosures like those described above may not be possible.  Interview with Thomas W. Hough, 
supra note 96. 
 209. ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION 123–28 (2008). 
 210. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2005 (2010). 
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loans to banks and other mortgage lenders.211  This will have a significant 
impact on the number of loans made and the interest rates charged on those 
loans.212  The decrease in loans and increase in interest rates will in turn have 
significantly impact home ownership.  However, if Congress, instead of 
creating the BCFP, passed a statute banning unfair or deceptive practices and 
allowed a private right of action, the costs of making loans would only increase 
for those lenders using unfair or deceptive practices, and only those lenders 
would have to recoup the additional costs through increased fees or interest 
rates.  This would make loans from these lenders less attractive than other 
lenders—achieving a deterrent effect and preventing deceptive loans from 
being made.  Those lenders who make proper disclosures and operate legally 
and ethically would be able to continue those practices free from an increased 
regulatory burden.  All lenders did not cause the financial crisis, so the focus of 
Congressional action should have been on those that did cause the crisis. 
CONCLUSION 
The Great Recession has been difficult for everyone.  The federal 
government chose to bail out numerous failing financial institutions that made 
loans without regard for the risks associated with them.  Many people, both 
prime and subprime borrowers, have lost their homes to foreclosure.  Countless 
more have found themselves behind on mortgages and owing more on their 
home than it is worth.  This is a tragic situation, and steps should be taken to 
prevent a similar crisis from occurring in the future.  However, the BCFP is not 
the solution consumers need.  The protections offered by the BCFP are 
duplicative of previous consumer protections and will likely result in credit 
being scarcer and more expensive. 
Instead of creating the BCFP, Congress should have reviewed the existing 
consumer protection laws and passed amendments or further legislation 
allowing subprime borrowers who were the victims of predatory lenders to 
obtain sufficient remedies on their own through civil litigation.  The 
amendments or new causes of action should have punished dishonest, deceitful 
lenders by providing punitive damages for egregious breaches and allowing 
rescission of unfair and abusive contracts.  Congress should also have 
simplified disclosures and perhaps mandated credit counseling for consumers 
before they obtain mortgage loans.  Those changes would have fulfilled the 
 
 211. Evans & Wright, supra note 96, at 39–40. 
 212. Id.  Modifying current federal consumer protection laws or passing a new consumer 
protection law would likely still require lenders to incur additional costs to determine if their 
practices are unfair or deceptive.  Additionally, courts would still be required to decipher the 
meaning of those terms.  However, these costs would likely be less than those associated with 
creating an entirely new government bureau. 
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goals of the BCFP without creating the bureaucratic and legal quagmire that 
comes with it. 
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